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
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CHINA AND THE GREAT POWER BALANCE



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FOREWORD

This memorandum examines both the immediate and the long-term impact of China on the global balance of power. The author first identifies the relevant national interests and security objectives of the three principal actors: the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. He then analyzes the near-term implications of China's increasingly independent international strategy for Sino-Soviet relations, US-China relations, and the US-Soviet military balance. Finally, he looks at China's potential as a world power in the year 2000, and concludes that its emergence on the global stage may create a tripolar balance of power by the end of this century.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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Brigadier General, USA
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TODD R. STARBUCK, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1980 following an assignment in Singapore. A China Foreign Area Officer and a specialist in Asian security matters, he holds master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (national security affairs) and the US Army Command and General Staff College (military art and science). He has also served in a variety of armored cavalry command and staff assignments in the United States and Vietnam. He has recently assumed new duties as a political-military analyst assigned to US Army Japan/IX Corps.

SUMMARY

Recent indications of a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, coupled with continued strains in US-China relations, call attention once again to the important role played by China in the great power balance. Chinese attempts to forge a substantive security relationship with the United States reached a high point following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but now have been quietly abandoned. In fact, the United States is often criticized by the Chinese media in terms once reserved solely for the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, China's opening to the outside world has been consistently reaffirmed, and contacts with the West through trade, investment, and technology transfer have increased dramatically in the 1980's.

The crucial national interests of the three principal actors in this triangular relationship are the key to understanding the significance of recent developments. The United States seeks to develop China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union hopes to drive a wedge between Washington and Beijing and split the anti-Soviet coalition. China, meanwhile, sees an opportunity to occupy the coveted "pivot position" in the triangular relationship, and is also reestablishing its leadership credentials among the developing Third World countries. However, economic development is China's first priority concern.

Due to a variety of constraints, both substantive and psychological, the Sino-Soviet thaw is not likely to extend beyond a general reduction of tensions or, at most, a limited accommodation. US-China relations will continue to exhibit strains, especially over Taiwan, but China's interests can best be served by friendly relations with the United States and the West—the sources of badly needed technology for modernization. Moreover, China and the Soviet Union are long-term geostrategic rivals and the USSR will remain the principal threat to China's security. Conversely, China is to some extent already a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, and a significant shift of the latter's forces from the east to the NATO front, either in peacetime or during a superpower conflict, is unlikely.

As the 20th century draws to a close, China's strategic nuclear capabilities and growing international presence should elevate it to a position of greater prestige and influence. Although its

capabilities will fall far short of those enjoyed by the two superpowers, China—already the third-ranking power in many respects—has the potential to become an even more serious global competitor. As a result, the current bipolar balance could be replaced by an asymmetrical tripolar balance early in the next century.

CHINA AND THE GREAT POWER BALANCE

Strategists and statesmen in the West recognize intuitively that China is, to some as yet unspecified extent, a factor in the global balance of power. Far too large and distinct, both culturally and geographically, to be absorbed into the Soviet security system as another satellite, China has emerged as a major regional and global competitor of the Soviet Union.

The existing pattern of US-China-USSR triangular relations is not merely the product of developments since the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, or President Nixon's visit to China, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather, it is part of a long and distinctive history of great power involvement in China's affairs predating the establishment of the People's Republic.

The scramble among the Western powers and Japan for political and economic advantage had brought China to the brink of dissolution by the beginning of this century. World War I weakened the sway of the imperialists, however, and awakened a spirit of intense nationalism in many Chinese intellectuals. This spirit spread to the masses during the period between the wars, when China attempted painful and ultimately unsuccessful transition to republican government. The victorious Communists

proclaimed an end to a century of humiliation and foreign domination in 1949, but immediately turned to the Soviet Union for economic assistance and international support. The United States, meanwhile, was castigated as a capitalist and imperialist warmonger, and the principal threat to the new Chinese Communist state.

From a historical perspective, the period of Sino-Soviet alliance was remarkably short. Personality conflicts, ideological disputes, and unfulfilled expectations on both sides contributed to a rapid deterioration of the relationship after 1954, prompting Mao Zedong to adopt a "dual adversary" strategy in the early 1960's. Emerging from its self-destructive binge during the Cultural Revolution, China found itself more isolated in the world than at any time since the early 19th century. The process of Sino-American rapprochement, initiated in 1969-70 primarily to alleviate this isolation, accelerated in the late 1970's as a result of the growing perception in both Washington and Beijing of unrelenting Soviet expansionism. However, the US-China strategic relationship, up to now based almost exclusively on mutual antipathy toward the Soviet Union, is only one part of a much more complex set of interrelationships. Recent developments in Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations have reconfirmed this complexity and underscore the need for a fuller understanding in the West of the dynamics of the triangular relationship.

US-China relations cooled considerably in 1981 with China's growing criticism of US global policy, its generally more independent and assertive stance, and a strong reaffirmation of its solidarity with the Third World. The first phase of a reformulation of Chinese foreign policy along lines more closely resembling the "classical" conceptualization of Mao's Theory of the Three Worlds was underway.

During 1982, three major interrelated trends were discernible in China's foreign relations. First was the persistence of an acrimonious relationship with the United States, centering on the issue of continued US arms sales to Taiwan. Solutions proved maddeningly elusive and despite a series of US conciliatory gestures throughout the year, Sino-American relations had dropped to a postnormalization low by year's end. The second major trend was an apparent breakthrough in the Sino-Soviet dispute, most noticeably after the death of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in

November, which raised the possibility of at least a marginal reduction in bilateral tensions. The third trend, China's deepening involvement in and identification with the Third World, was also a carry-over from 1981, but by the end of 1982, it appeared to have supplanted the earlier "united front against hegemony" formulation which explicitly incorporated the United States into the "antihegemony front."

Although events through the first several months of 1983 tended to confirm these trends, by midsummer the first two were clearly less pronounced. Despite continuing strains over Taiwan, US-China relations warmed somewhat as a result of progress on longstanding trade and technology transfer issues, coupled with increasing economic payoffs for China from its "opening to the outside world." Meanwhile, prospects for significant improvements in Sino-Soviet ties dimmed noticeably as the first blush of reconciliation gave way to inconclusive bargaining on substantive differences.

This ebb and flow in bilateral relations is likely to remain a consistent feature of the triangular relationship in the future, and should not be permitted to obscure the fundamental, underlying interests of the principals. The discussion which follows will attempt to identify these interests, and will assess the nature and extent of China's impact on the US-Soviet balance of power.

US INTERESTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The identification of broad, fundamental *interests* is an essential first step in formulating a national strategy, but the interests themselves have little or no operational utility until they are translated into concrete national security *objectives*. Moreover, interests represent only part of the equation in strategic planning; *perceived threats* to national security are the second principal ingredient. As defined here, interests are more or less immutable, and include (1) survival; (2) sovereignty (independence, unity, and territorial integrity); (3) a favorable world order; and (4) economic well-being. An ideological component, the promotion of national values abroad, can also be added.¹ Because these interests are closely interrelated, each one shapes national security policy to some extent. Over time, changes in the content of these fundamental interests and the perceived threats to them, produce

US objectives in the Asia-Pacific region complement, and in some instances directly implement, global security objectives. However, factors of geography, demography, and politics are such that presently no nation in the region, aside from the Soviet Union, constitutes a direct threat to the survival or sovereignty of the United States. US interests thus focus on economic well-being, a favorable world order, and an environment conducive to the promotion of American values. While political and ideological interests are longstanding, the economic dimension has grown in importance in recent years. Since 1976, total annual US trade with East and South Asia and Pacific Oceania has equalled or exceeded US trade with Western Europe.⁴

Regional security objectives are influenced by economic and political considerations, but are primarily determined by US world order interests.⁵ In a March 1982 speech to the Japan National Press Club, in which he identified the "six pillars of America's Asian policy," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger provided the definitive statement of the administration's approach to the security of the region. The six pillars are (1) the intent of the United States to remain a Pacific power; (2) the primacy of the political, economic, and security relationship with Japan; (3) the principle of freedom and independence for the Korean peninsula; (4) the strategic rapprochement with China; (5) support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and (6) an expanding US presence in Southwest Asia.⁶

In a manner reminiscent of earlier statements by Carter Administration officials, Secretary Weinberger outlined the US rationale for a cooperative Sino-American relationship on all three levels: global, regional, and bilateral.

Our policies toward China are predicated on the belief that a strong, secure and progressing China is in our national interest and that of our allies. We are prepared to contribute in a responsible way to China's modernization, both for the benefit of China and of the United States, and we want to do so in ways which enhance our own security and that of our allies and friends We seek to build an enduring relationship with China that recognizes our common interests and our differences and which permits us to take complementary actions when our common interests are challenged.

A brief review of each of the other components of US regional security policy, as defined by the Secretary of Defense, underscores

changes in objectives, i.e., the supporting goals and aims of national strategy or policy.

Any assessment of the impact of China on US interests and objectives is complicated by the nature of international relations. In this instance, the United States and China interact simultaneously on three distinct but interrelated levels: global, regional, and bilateral. Ideally, the objectives established on the bilateral level would be fully compatible with those on the global and regional levels. Of course, in reality, they seldom are. Ordering priorities and developing policies in such a complex environment is an extremely difficult task, and one which no nation has been able to accomplish with complete success. In the case of China and the United States, for example, both parties perceive the Soviet Union as the principal threat to their crucial interests. Because the Reagan Administration has generally adopted a more forceful stance toward the Soviet Union than did the Carter Administration, the Reagan stance should be more appealing to China than that of its predecessor. In practice, the opposite has proved true, because incompatible views on several important *bilateral* issues have tended to attenuate the Sino-American strategic consensus.

The global dimension of US national security policy focuses primarily on the Soviet Union and the threat it poses to US national interests. This is prudent since the Soviet Union is the only country which is capable of independently threatening either the survival or sovereignty of the United States. President Reagan's national security strategy, which became clear in 1982-83 through the statements of administration spokesmen, emphasizes some traditional themes, such as deterrence, strategic force modernization, improved conventional capabilities, support for allies, and forward deployment of US forces.² Greater emphasis has been placed on a coalition strategy, designed to exploit the capabilities of allies and friends and to augment these capabilities by means of an expanded security assistance program. The overarching objective of US national security policy is to "prevail with pride" by forcing the Soviet Union to "bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings" and by convincing its leadership "to turn their attention inward, to seek the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of the governed, and thus to address the hopes and dreams of their own people."³

both the potentialities and the limitations of the US-China security relationship he envisioned. So long as the Soviet Union remains the principal threat to Chinese interests and China itself remains relatively weak militarily—both long-term propositions—the determination of the United States to maintain a forceful presence in the Pacific will be welcomed by China. The growing prodefense consensus in Japan has likewise been encouraged by China in recent years as a positive contribution to the latter's anti-Soviet united front strategy. This sentiment has practical limits, however, as the controversy in mid-1982 over Japanese textbook revisions demonstrated. China is not likely to favor a significant expansion of Japanese military capabilities which appear (1) to be well beyond those required purely for self-defense or (2) to justify a reduced US military commitment to East Asia.⁴

The situation on the Korean peninsula also offers both challenges and opportunities to the US-China relationship. Clearly the interests of all the major outside powers, including the Soviet Union, are best served by continued peace on the peninsula. China maintains close political, economic, and ideological relations with the North Korean regime of Kim Il-sung. These ties, which have been expanding recently at Soviet expense, place Beijing in a position to discourage any ill-conceived reunification moves by P'yongyang. While US security interests are served as a result, these interrelationships are precarious at present, and US-China ties could be severely strained by a resumption of fighting on the peninsula or even a serious crisis.

In Southeast and Southwest Asia, the last two "pillars," the prospects for productive US-China strategic cooperation are similarly ambivalent. Southeast Asia remains polarized into two groups: Communist Indochina, dominated by Vietnam, and the non-Communist developing countries which compose ASEAN. Since its split with Hanoi in the late 1970's, China has vigorously supported ASEAN in its anti-Vietnam campaign over Kampuchea. US and Chinese objectives *vis-a-vis* ASEAN and Vietnam are thus compatible in some respects, even though their motives differ. China has been particularly vocal in its support for Thailand, the ASEAN "frontline state," but remains a controversial partner.⁵ Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, are suspicious of Beijing's regional aspirations and tend to view China, rather than the Soviet Union, as the more serious long-term threat to their security

interests. In an attempt to improve its image with the ASEAN countries, China has reduced its ties with indigenous Communist insurgent groups to relatively inconsequential levels. Although the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia welcomed the Sino-American rapprochement, lingering distrust of China would predispose them against an expanded US-China security relationship.¹⁰

The short-term compatibility of US and Chinese objectives is more apparent, and less controversial, in Southwest Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly halted the tentative warming of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1979 and added fuel to their simmering dispute. Pakistan, the recent recipient of a \$3.2 billion military sales and economic aid package from the United States, is a longstanding regional ally of China as well. Together, these three countries have spearheaded the international reaction to the Soviet occupation. Even Indira Gandhi, whose initial criticism of the invasion hardly qualified as a condemnation, has recently sought to establish a more balanced relationship with Washington, while simultaneously improving India's bilateral relations with Pakistan.

Bilateral relations constitute the third and final level on which the evolving US-China cooperative relationship is played out. Economic well-being is the principal, but not the only, US interest served; the impact on world order and ideological interests is clearly evident as well. The formalization of trade and investment procedures since 1979 has greatly facilitated the expansion of commercial ties. Two-way trade between the two countries totaled less than \$400 million in 1977, but more than doubled each of the next three years to reach \$4.9 billion by 1980. Volume began to level off in 1981, climbing to \$5.5 billion with the balance less heavily in favor of the United States. This trend continued in 1982; in fact, US-China trade dropped slightly to \$5.2 billion. Despite this burgeoning trade, the total volume in 1981—when China ranked 14th among US trading partners—was still slightly less than half that between the United States and Taiwan.¹¹

Exploration and development of China's vast oil reserves, which a recent Chinese estimate optimistically placed at 219 billion barrels, may eventually prove to be the most lucrative area for Sino-American economic cooperation.¹² China cannot begin to reach its full energy potential, particularly in offshore production,

without substantial inputs of Western drilling technology and investment capital. US corporations are well-positioned to meet China's needs. In September 1982, the Atlantic Richfield Company became the first American oil company to sign an offshore drilling contract with its official Chinese counterpart. It will be joined in the South China Sea by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and the Exxon Corporation, both of which won major drilling contracts in August 1983 after a year-long round of competitive bidding.¹³

China's opening to the West has another important dimension as well: advanced schooling and technical training. Over 8,000 Chinese students, the largest single group from any foreign country, are studying in the United States.¹⁴ Several hundred Americans are studying in China, although reciprocity in scholarly exchanges has not yet been achieved. On the other hand, tens of thousands of Americans visit China annually as tourists, and cultural exchanges and exhibits—such as the one at the recent Knoxville World's Fair—have provided a glimpse of China to millions more. While bilateral educational and cultural contacts may have little impact on US-China security relations, they are crucial ingredients in building a stable, positive, and durable relationship between the two nations.

Taiwan is by far the most divisive issue in US-China bilateral relations and its implications pervade the global and regional dimensions of the relationship as well. This is a complex and emotional problem, deeply rooted in the political cultures of both nations and devoid of quick or easy solutions. Recent efforts to ameliorate the increasing strains caused by Taiwan have been only partially successful. If unresolved, and they may well be unresolvable for the present, these strains will inevitably limit the nature and scope of future Sino-American strategic cooperation.¹⁵

In order to analyze critically the strategic rationale which underlies US-China relations in general and US-China security relations in particular, an attempt must be made to go beyond generalities and to define more precisely the operational components of this rationale.¹⁶ However, if generalities are excluded from the discussion, then surprisingly little of substance remains. In a broad global sense, the United States views China as a "strategic counterweight" to the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Implicit here are nonhostile relations between China and the United States which

now allow each party essentially to ignore the other as a serious military threat and concentrate its attention and resources on the Soviet Union instead. This in turn poses a more credible two-front threat to the Soviet Union and leads, hopefully, to improved deterrence on both fronts.

In a more concrete sense, only one operational objective of a US-China strategic alignment has ever been publicly articulated from the US perspective. That objective—which presupposes continued Sino-Soviet enmity—is for China to pose a credible threat to Soviet territory or interests sufficient to preclude or at least discourage the shifting of Soviet forces to another theater, either in peacetime or during an undefined East-West conflict. This objective is usually expressed in terms of “tying down” the estimated 500,000 Soviet troops stationed on or near the Chinese border.¹⁸ Other objectives are either too narrowly focused, such as the shared intelligence sites reportedly in Western China,¹⁹ or are too problematic to serve as realistic planning factors. In the latter category are hypothetical scenarios which postulate substantive military cooperation between the United States and China if either or both become involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union.

Despite the modest scope and content of the current strategic relationship, it is not insignificant—particularly if one assumes that Soviet forces no longer required on the Chinese border could be redeployed against NATO, or be repositioned to reinforce more easily the NATO front.

SOVIET INTERESTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

As one of the world's two superpowers, the fundamental national interests of the Soviet Union are similar to those of the United States. Survival and sovereignty naturally assume the highest priority and only the opposing superpower poses a credible immediate threat. The late President Brezhnev, in one of his last major speeches, described the nature of that threat as it was viewed from Moscow. “The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched a political, ideological and economic offensive on socialism and have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level.”²⁰ The centrality of the United States is evident in every aspect of the Soviet strategic calculus at the global level, including economic, ideological, and world order interests.

The underlying attitudes and assumptions of Soviet decisionmakers regarding the United States are necessarily a matter of conjecture among Western analysts, but the cumulative record of Soviet behavior is sufficient to afford some useful insights. Harry Gelman of the Rand Corporation has identified a set of postulates and objectives which could be considered the essence of the Soviet leadership's contemporary world view. He sees Soviet strategy toward the United States as both defensive and coercive; it seeks to free the Soviet Union from US-imposed isolation and, in turn, isolate the United States from its allies and friends. Soviet leaders perceive that trends in the correlation of forces—"an amorphous amalgam of political, social, economic, and military factors"—have been favorable to the Soviet Union over the past decade. While the US advantage has dwindled and the "enervating effects" of American pluralism represent a serious US weakness, the Soviet Union must be continually prepared to safeguard its authority within its own bloc; to further its aspirations for global preeminence; and to preserve the favorable military asymmetries which it now enjoys. "The common element in this family of defensive-offensive concerns is the assumption that if the Politburo does not continue to press for advantage, it may fall back." Differences between the United States and its allies are deep, perhaps even fundamental, and offer opportunities to split the anti-Soviet coalition. Finally, the Soviet leadership is determined to insulate its external ambitions from its serious economic weaknesses and internal difficulties.²¹ If successful in this regard, the Politburo would neutralize the ultimate objective of the Reagan national security strategy outlined earlier: to compel the Soviet Union to redirect its energies and resources from expansionism to domestic priorities.

By virtue of geography, the Soviet Union is not only a global power, but a regional power in both Europe and Asia. And as a continental power, its global and regional interests are closely intertwined. Indeed, the Soviet geostrategic position is considerably more precarious than that of the United States, which is blessed with wide oceans on two sides and nonthreatening nations on the other two. The vastness of the Soviet Union is both an asset and a liability; although it dominates the Eurasian landmass, it is not unassailable. The proximity of Soviet territory to competing power centers, combined with centrifugal tendencies within the Soviet

empire, creates a sense of vulnerability in the minds of the leadership. Whether such external threats are plausible any longer in light of the USSR's impressive nuclear arsenal is irrelevant; conditioned by centuries of violent history, Soviet leaders *accept* this vulnerability as the basic assumption underlying their national security strategy.²²

Its claims to be an Asian power notwithstanding, the Soviet Union is a relative latecomer to East Asia and the Northwest Pacific. Nonetheless, it is the only European colonial power which has been able to retain—and even expand—its empire in Asia. Despite a strong residual interest in Siberia and the Far Eastern territories, the Soviet Union's understandable preoccupation with the security of its western flanks meant that initially its eastern domain would be accorded a much lower strategic priority.²³ Moreover, threats from the east tended to be more manageable—during World War II, for example, a conflict with Japan was postponed until the very end of the war. Finally, the low order of political and economic power which the Soviet Union was able to wield in Asia, as compared to Europe, contributed to a lower level of interest in the Far East.²⁴

This situation began to change after the defeat of Japan, and in the postwar period Soviet diplomatic and security objectives in the region were gradually upgraded. This trend accelerated after 1965 due to (1) the deterioration and then complete collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the late 1950's and early 1960's;²⁵ (2) the continuation of the cold war and the US-Soviet competition in Asia; (3) the increasing availability of resources for strengthening security on the less sensitive eastern flank; (4) the new demographics of the Soviet Union and the need to disperse populations and industries for both strategic and economic reasons; and most importantly, (5) the deepening Sino-American rapprochement which emerged after 1970. This linkage between the Soviet Union's two most dangerous adversaries—tentative and conditional though it was—established a pattern of triangular politics which was to persist into the next decade and necessitate a fundamental and far-reaching reassessment of the threat to Soviet national interests. The most salient characteristic of this triangular relationship was the more or less chronic disadvantage at which the Soviet Union found itself *vis-a-vis* the powers at the other two corners of the triangle. This condition reinforced Moscow's

tendency to turn to the only means of leverage at its disposal: a gradual but ultimately substantial increase in Soviet military power, both globally and regionally.²⁶

Soviet survival, sovereignty, and world order interests in Asia are now being complemented by crucial domestic economic interests in Siberia and the Far East, an area of tremendous untapped natural resources. Despite the region's harsh environment and sparse population, Soviet leaders are proceeding with the intensive development of Siberia's vast energy (oil, gas, coal) and mineral resources, and the construction of an indigenous industrial base and a transportation infrastructure to move raw materials and manufactured goods immense distances to foreign and domestic markets. Although handicapped by a shortage of investment capital and inadequate extractive technology, the Soviet Union has no alternative if it is to maintain resource self-sufficiency and begin to balance its massive foreign exchange shortfalls. As sources of energy and minerals in the western USSR are exhausted or seriously depleted, Soviet planners will be forced to draw increasingly from the east in order to propel their stagnating economy into the next century.²⁷ Nevertheless, numerous intractable obstacles remain.²⁸

Given the long-term economic importance of the eastern USSR, the strategic vulnerability of the region (especially Eastern Siberia and the Far East) is a source of major concern. And if the eastern anchor of the Soviet empire is vulnerable, then Western Siberia and the central heartland of the USSR are threatened as well. Over two-thirds of Siberia's population of 30 million are concentrated in the south, near the border with China. In the Far East, much of the population lives adjacent to the Chinese border, along the double-track Trans-Siberian Railroad which parallels the course of the Amur River to Khabarovsk, and then turns south to Vladivostok and the Pacific coast. The Trans-Siberian is the lifeline of East Siberia and the Far East (60 percent of the region's food requirements must be shipped in), and lies within a few miles of Chinese territory at several points. The vulnerability of this link will be partially alleviated if construction of the oft-delayed Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), roughly paralleling the Trans-Siberian, is completed as planned by 1985. Although it lies 150 to 300 miles north of the Chinese border, the BAM would also be subject to interdiction in wartime, and, in any event, will extend no farther east than Komsomol'sk and the connecting line south to

Khabarovsk. The significance of the BAM thus appears to be at least as much economic as it is strategic.²⁹

Soviet policy in Asia is multifaceted and derives from both global and regional interests of the USSR. Among these, economic well-being ranks low. Although Siberia is crucially important to long-range development, Soviet attempts to elicit foreign investment and technological assistance have yielded poor results overall. Economic relations with the countries of Asia, other than Japan, are very limited.³⁰ Ideological, economic, and even world order interests thus defer to the primacy of fundamental security interests which transcend expansionist ambitions in Soviet Far Eastern policy. Vulnerabilities inherent in the Soviet geostrategic emplacement in Asia pose serious challenges to Moscow, while constraining opportunities to exercise power and influence.

Aside from the United States and China, potentially the most important Asian relationship for the Soviet Union is that with Japan. Nevertheless, Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated during the past decade and show no sign of imminent improvement. The singular lack of flexibility in Soviet diplomacy toward Japan, as demonstrated by the uncompromising position in the disputed Northern Territories adjacent to Hokkaido, appears rooted in the traditional Russian conviction that the only way to deal effectively with the Japanese is by employing threats and coercion. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 was partially responsible for the hardening of Soviet attitudes. The ongoing reinforcement and upgrading of its military garrison in the Northern Territories—the three large islands and one small island group at the southern end of the Kuril Island chain—was one Soviet response. The rapprochement between Japan and China was also a factor in the buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet after 1978, but the consequences were counterproductive in both instances. The Soviet Union made few political gains in Tokyo and succeeded only in sharpening the Japanese perception of threat, which until then had been unfocused at best (and indeed nonexistent in some quarters).³¹ Soviet economic interests did not suffer appreciably, however, until Japan joined in the economic sanctions imposed in the wake of the Afghan invasion and the crisis in Poland. As a result, extensive Japanese participation in the development of Siberian resources—long sought by the Soviet Union—was deferred indefinitely.³²

Elsewhere in Asia, the Soviet Union pursues complementary policies designed to reduce, contain, or eliminate the power and influence of both China and the United States. The main features of its strategy are expansionism and opportunism on the one hand, balanced by patience and a desire to avoid a direct military confrontation with either rival on the other. Although afflicted with a deep sense of insecurity as well as serious social ills, the Soviet Union nonetheless seems confident in the ultimate triumph of its system.

On the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union formally supports Kim Il-sung's reunification demands, but not to the point of a North Korean attack on the South. Kim's delicate balancing act between Moscow and Beijing has resulted in a succession of "tilts" over the past five years. These shifting alignments are largely due to a fundamental ambivalence on the part of both the Soviet Union and China: neither sees any advantage in an attack by North Korea which could lead to a confrontation with the United States, or is willing to exchange the *status quo* for a unified Korea in which it might lose what influence it presently enjoys.¹³

The interests of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia are corollaries of its global and regional interests, but its policies are bifurcated along ideological lines. Soviet diplomatic initiatives, such as Brezhnev's ill-fated collective security proposal, have been consistently rebuffed by the non-Communist nations of the region. Indeed, the Soviet Union is even less attractive now than it was in 1969, when Brezhnev first floated his proposal. The five non-Communist countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) composing ASEAN are experiencing unprecedented economic growth and rising standards of living, while the Soviet (as well as the Chinese) social and developmental model is badly tarnished. Moreover, the growth and projection of Soviet naval capabilities, coupled with the Soviet Union's continuing \$3 million a day subsidy of the Vietnamese¹⁴ and their occupation of Kampuchea, have alarmed everyone. As a result, the ASEAN countries are upgrading their individual defenses against external aggression and are moving slowly in the direction of collective security.¹⁵ Given its estrangement from the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, Moscow has little choice except to capitalize on Vietnam's dependence to further Soviet influence in the region.¹⁶

Although confined to flexing its military might for the time being, the access afforded the USSR to naval and air facilities in Vietnam has direct implications for Soviet national security interests. The southern sea route via the Indian Ocean represents an important alternate link to the Soviet Far East, supplementing the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Malacca-Singapore Straits and the Indonesian Straits of Sunda, Lombok-Makassar, and Ombai-Wetar constitute the principal links between the Pacific and Indian Oceans for both the US and Soviet navies.¹⁷ These straits are also chokepoints along Japan's vital sea lines of communication, through which two-thirds of its crude oil imports must transit. Another 15 percent of Japanese oil imports originate in Indonesia.¹⁸ Soviet forward bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang, and elsewhere permit peacetime surveillance of the region and could be used to stage combat operations in wartime.¹⁹

Southeast Asia also provides a connecting link to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, where Soviet objectives are similar but the prospects for success are marginally brighter. This region leaped into the consciousness of the West in the late 1970's as a result of the successive crises in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the preceding decade the Soviet Union had assiduously courted India, establishing a firm bilateral alignment which proved highly profitable for both partners. Meanwhile, China had refurbished its *entente cordiale* with Pakistan as the United States tended, for a time, toward noninvolvement in South Asian regional affairs. But as noted earlier, Mrs. Gandhi has sought since mid-1982 to place some distance between herself and Moscow by simultaneously seeking to improve relations with Pakistan, China, and the United States. As a result, the prospects for wider Soviet political influence have received at least a temporary setback, providing still another incentive to resolve the Afghan problem quickly.

It is clear that Soviet interests in bilateral relations with China are inextricably bound up with its global and regional interests. Despite a visceral fear of China which sometimes borders on paranoia, China—as an independent actor—is presently a lower order security threat than the United States and its NATO allies. Thus the Soviet Union will seek to decouple China from any substantive alignment with other major powers, especially a US-Japan-China coalition with transregional linkages to NATO. Soviet leaders have

been waiting patiently since the death of Mao to improve relations with China and recent initiatives reflect their measured, incremental approach. China now appears favorably disposed to a lessening of bilateral tensions for reasons of its own. Progress on at least one of the three preconditions it has set for the "normalization" of relations—reduction of forces on the Chinese border, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and termination of support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea—is a possibility which cannot be discounted. In any event, the Soviet leadership views a reduction of tensions with China not only as a short-term gain, but as an essential first step in the process of splitting the anti-Soviet coalition and eventually isolating both the United States and China.

Other bilateral issues once prominent in the Sino-Soviet dispute contributed to the initial split but have now faded into the background or been overtaken by actuarial inevitabilities. Ideological purity is hardly a matter for serious contention; both sides are sufficiently "deviationist" or "revisionist" that neither sees any advantage in berating the other over a point upon which they are themselves vulnerable. The border dispute could be quickly removed to the negotiating table, if the Soviet leaders were agreeable, and the Chinese have set aside the larger territorial question, at least for the time being. In past negotiations with other neighbors, the Chinese have demonstrated a willingness to compromise on the specifics of a border agreement so long as a political settlement was reached.⁴⁰ Finally, the personality conflicts which poisoned the atmosphere 20 years ago died with Khrushchev and Mao. The rancor and emotional rhetoric of personal diplomacy have been replaced with formal diplomacy conducted largely by ministers of state and professional bureaucrats.

Nationalism and pragmatic self-interest are the fundamental issues which will separate China and the Soviet Union in the future as the latter seeks to preserve a decisive advantage over its less powerful geostrategic rival.

CHINA IN TRANSITION

China exists today on an economic level which is not only far below that of the superpowers and the other developed countries, but which threatens to consign China permanently to a position of

global inferiority and consequent strategic vulnerability. This prospect is totally incompatible with the aspirations of China's leaders, who are committed to the eventual "restoration" of their country to the first rank of world powers. In order to fulfill this vision in the next century, China has embarked since 1978 on a massive, highly ambitious program of economic and technological development. While economic well-being will not (and indeed cannot) supplant survival and sovereignty interests as first priority, the developmental program is so closely linked to China's contemporary security concerns that it deserves a brief review.

China's leaders began to revise their collective assessment of the world situation following the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. As a result, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the principal threat to Chinese security interests. These and other concerns prompted the Chinese to seek rapprochement with the United States, now only the "second major enemy" in their revised formulation, shortly thereafter. At some point during the five year period from 1968 to 1973—precisely when depends upon one's interpretation of the limited information available—a separate, but interrelated, decision was made to give economic development the top domestic priority. During the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, an ailing Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the bare outline of a modernization program, calling for modernization in four key sectors: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology.⁴²

Following the deaths in 1976 of first Zhou and then Mao, Hua Guofeng, a moderate Maoist, emerged from the ensuing tumult as both premier and Party chairman. Hua developed the basic outline of the "Four Modernizations" program in early 1978, but his misguided preference for heavy industry over agriculture—compounded by unrealistic growth and production targets—contributed to his subsequent political demise. Deng Xiaoping, China's leading pragmatic reformer, had been "rehabilitated" for a second time in 1977 and over a three year period he was able to wrest control of the Party and state bureaucracies from Hua and his associates. By 1981, Deng's developmental program was firmly in place and proteges Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had replaced Hua as Party chairman and premier, respectively.

The 12th National Party Congress in September 1982 marked the culmination of Deng's drive for political supremacy. In his report to the Congress, Chairman Hu Yaobang established the "general objective" of China's economic construction: to quadruple the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production between 1981 and the year 2000.

This will place China in the front ranks of the countries of the world in terms of gross national income and the output of major industrial and agricultural products; it will represent an important advance in the modernization of her entire national economy; it will increase the income of her urban and rural population several times over; and the Chinese people will be comparatively well-off both materially and culturally. Although China's national income per capita will even then be relatively low, her economic growth strength *and national defense capabilities* will have grown considerably, compared with what they are today." (Italics added.)

The vehicle for implementing this policy in the near term was provided a few months later, at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, when Premier Zhao Ziyang outlined the major provisions of the long-awaited Sixth Five-Year Plan. The new plan, covering the period 1981-85 and therefore two years retroactive, calls for a continuation of the policy of slow but solid economic growth followed by the Dengists since late 1978. Annual growth of industrial and agricultural output is set at a modest, and probably achievable, 4 percent. The present leadership appears determined to avoid past mistakes, particularly unrealistic, overly ambitious production targets."

CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

While economic development remains a major long-term objective of China's modernization program, it is not just an end in itself. Rather, it is viewed as an essential prerequisite for attaining other national objectives of comparable importance. In his opening address to the 12th National Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed the three major tasks for the coming decade and succinctly defined the role that modernization would play.

To intensify socialist modernization, to strive for reunification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, and to combat hegemonism and safeguard world peace—these are the three major tasks of our people in the 1980s. Economic construction is at the core of these tasks as it is the basis for the solution of China's external and domestic problems."

China clearly believes that its interests cannot be satisfied or its future security assured unless it is able to achieve its developmental goals. "Socialist construction" is a long-term process, and China presumably requires an extended period of international peace and domestic stability. This view partially explains China's abandonment of Mao Zedong's attempts in the 1960's to radicalize and destabilize not only the non-Communist nations of the world, but his own country as well.

Whatever the vicissitudes of its relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union, a common thread which runs through all the various phases of China's foreign policy is identification with the interests and problems of the developing countries, the Third World in Mao's conceptualization of the international system. A self-proclaimed developing country, with recent memories of foreign subjugation and no natural geographic allies, China naturally aspires to a leadership role among these nations.

Mao's "Theory of the Three Worlds" evolved gradually from his earlier, more simplistic notion of a world divided into two camps, socialist and capitalist. By the early 1970's, Mao saw the world divided into three groups: the First World, consisting only of the two superpowers, both struggling for hegemony; the Second World, consisting of the other developed countries of Europe, North America, and Japan; and the Third World, composed of the weak, the poor, and the exploited. In a major speech at the United Nations in April 1974, Deng Xiaoping expounded the theory in detail, castigating both the superpowers—especially the Soviet Union—for "vainly seeking world hegemony," and calling on the Third World countries to "strengthen their unity" and "struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony." Subsequent refinements to the theory in the late 1970's included an expanded role for the developed countries of the Second World as allies of the Third World in the battle against superpower hegemonism. The hegemonic nature of the United States was downplayed even more in the aftermath of unabated improvements in Soviet military

capabilities in the Far East and the accelerated deterioration in Chinese relations with pro-Soviet Vietnam. By 1978, the dominant theme in the Chinese formulation was the "united front against hegemony," which incorporated the United States as a full partner in the struggle to defeat Soviet hegemony.⁴⁷

Despite emphasis on political and economic solidarity with the Third World, China's survival, sovereignty, and world order interests are primarily dependent upon its relations with the two superpowers. Historically, these relationships have been driven by Beijing's perception of the relative threat posed by each—perceptions which have fluctuated widely over the years. For several years post-Mao Chinese commentaries expressed alarm over the apparently insatiable expansionist appetite of the Soviet Union while stressing the largely defensive nature of the United States. This assessment underwent a subtle alteration in 1981-82, however, as US-China relations became increasingly strained over a number of issues, the principal one being Taiwan.⁴⁸ The term "hegemonist," reserved almost exclusively for the USSR after the normalization of Sino-American relations, began to appear with increasing frequency in Chinese media characterizations of the United States as direct references to the united front were dropped. By late 1982, in a paean to the Third World—now "the main force in the antihegemonist struggle"—*Guangming Ribao* concluded that:

Since the start of the 1980's, the global contest between the Soviet and U.S. hegemonist powers has become ever more fierce The two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors and the main causes of instability and upheaval in the world.⁴⁹

Aside from the anti-US rhetoric, which is still quite mild compared to the vitriolic denunciations of the United States in the 1960's, the fact remains that the Soviet Union is the only superpower which presently poses a credible immediate threat to China's security. Interestingly, the Chinese seldom acknowledge this threat directly; rather the Soviet Union is identified as the "major threat to world peace."⁵⁰ The reasons for downplaying the Soviet threat to China while emphasizing that Europe is the USSR's primary objective—"feinting in the East while attacking in the

West"—are characteristically complex. Four distinct audiences are involved: the Soviet Union, the United States, Western Europe, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). First, China hopes to divert Soviet attention away from itself and toward Europe, while simultaneously complicating the Soviet Union's European detente strategy. Second, China hopes to alert both the United States and NATO Europe to the urgent need to bolster the Atlantic Alliance in the face of a growing Soviet military threat. If successful, NATO will be preserved as a credible potential threat to the Soviet western flank and the USSR will be unable to turn its full military might against China.¹¹ Third, the Chinese fear that if they appear too seriously threatened by the Soviet Union, it will reinforce Washington's "China Syndrome," the perception that "the Chinese need us more than we need them." Finally, the pragmatic ruling faction is attempting to convince the PLA, reputedly one of the last Maoist strongholds, that the Soviet security threat to China is long-term rather than immediate. Consequently, the central government can afford "temporarily" to divert scarce resources from defense modernization—the lowest in priority of the Four Modernizations—into development of a sound, broad-based economy which will provide substantially improved military capabilities in the more distant future.

If China is adjusting and perhaps compartmentalizing its strategic alignment with the United States, the current leadership clearly does not intend that cooler relations will extend to trade, investment, and technology transfer. The "opening to the West" has been seriously questioned by domestic critics of Deng Xiaoping not only because of the failure of the security relationship to blossom forth, but because widespread exposure to "pernicious influences" such as crime, corruption, and "bourgeois liberalism" are inevitable if contacts with the West are developed and expanded. Nevertheless, at the 12th National Party Congress, Deng declared that:

We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. At the same time, we will keep a clear head, firmly resist corrosion by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country.¹²

As a realist, Deng is aware that he is taking a calculated risk with this policy. Severe strains will be placed on the collective psyche of the Chinese people in the coming decades, as the transformation of social and political values accelerates in the drive for economic development. The creation of technical, managerial, and intellectual elites will supplant Maoist China's relative egalitarianism—and may, in fact, already have done so. The opening to the West will exacerbate these tendencies, but Deng has little choice if he expects China ever to become truly competitive with the rest of the world. The obvious alternative, which can never be discounted if his policies fail, is a return to a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist developmental strategy, accompanied by the reimposition of stringent control measures on all aspects of Chinese life.

One final dimension of China's global impact must be briefly addressed. As an element of national power, China's present military capabilities seriously constrain its influence. The low overall level of economic development, the longstanding tradition of self-reliance in all endeavors, and the vicissitudes of Chinese politics and economic policy over the past 30 years, have all perpetuated China's military inferiority and consequent strategic vulnerability. This is painfully apparent when comparing Chinese military capabilities to those of the Soviet Union, easily the most serious threat to China's security. Although China's huge armed forces—totaling over three million in the active ground components alone—outnumber those in the eastern military districts of the Soviet Union by at least six to one, the Soviet forces hold heavy quantitative and qualitative advantages in virtually every category of modern land, sea, and air weapons systems, whether conventional, theater nuclear, or strategic.¹¹ China is acutely aware of its vulnerability, and this realization is a driving imperative in the formulation of its foreign policies and national security strategies.

As a practical matter Chinese military weakness dictates strategy. To discourage a Soviet nuclear strike, the Chinese rely on their small strategic missile force—a modest assortment of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBM and IRBM), and a handful of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)—as a minimum deterrent. China's strategic capabilities approached a new level in October 1982, with the successful test launch of its first

sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), reportedly from a nuclear submarine.⁴⁴ Conventionally, China is saddled with "people's war under modern conditions," an updated version of Mao's classic strategic doctrine. Defensive in nature, the Chinese strategy presumes multiple penetrations of Chinese territory by mobile, well-equipped enemy forces enjoying air and firepower superiority. With a strategy similar to that employed by the Russians against Swedish, French, and Nazi invaders, the Chinese intend to "lure the enemy deep," resisting all the way, until he is overextended and the momentum of his attack has been dissipated. Massive counterattacks would then be launched by a combination of regular forces, militia, and guerrillas. Despite a great deal of critical discussion in the West about the relative merits of this strategy, the PLA has no realistic alternative to a "people's war" at present, even though it is not pleased by the situation.⁴⁵

As noted earlier, the modernization of national defense has been accorded the lowest priority among the Four Modernizations; however, this may be more out of necessity than an accurate reflection of national priorities. Given the magnitude of the task, the deficiencies in the PLA can only be corrected if China possesses a sound economy and a modern, efficient industrial base. Until China has laid the foundation for domestic armaments production, the full-scale modernization of national defense cannot proceed. Meanwhile, the Chinese cannot entertain any hope of purchasing outright enough weapons to make a real difference.⁴⁶

This brief review has touched on only a few of the more important issues which will determine China's impact on the global balance.⁴⁷ Due to its sheer mass, its growing international activism, and its distinctive world view, China is already an important, integral factor in world power calculations. Nonetheless, the full weight of its global impact will not be felt until well into the next century, and even then will be contingent upon China's success in controlling its population, increasing agricultural and industrial productivity, and providing an environment which satisfies both the material and the psychological needs of its vast citizenry.

A CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT

The synergistic nature of triangular and extra-triangular relations makes it impossible to organize conclusions under neat

holdings, but several broad areas need to be considered. These are the prospects for Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the future of US-China relations, and the implications for the US-Soviet military balance.

The Prospects for Sino-Soviet Rapprochement. As the warming trend in Sino-Soviet relations began to unfold in 1982-83, concern mounted in the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and elsewhere that this trend might adversely affect the security of the West. Discussion tended to be unfocused and often unproductive, however, and one major reason was the failure to make conceptual distinctions among the various terms used to describe the potential outcomes of this trend. In an attempt to overcome this handicap, an arbitrary continuum is suggested here which at least recognizes the not-too-subtle differences in these outcomes, and lends a bit more precision to our analysis. At least six separate outcomes can be used to establish a representative range; these are detente, normalization (China's stated goal), accommodation, rapprochement, entente, and alliance.¹⁴

Based on developments through mid-1983, a token Soviet troop withdrawal was still possible, and perhaps even likely, although the second round of bilateral talks concluded in March without visible progress.¹⁵ The Chinese demand for a withdrawal of some forces from the border as proof of the Soviet Union's goodwill is the one precondition which Soviet leaders could meet fairly easily. Some Chinese sources have demanded troop reductions back to the levels of the Khrushchev era, but this appears out of the question, inasmuch as the Soviet Union maintained only 17 divisions in the Far East in 1964, compared to 51 today. The other two preconditions—movement on the Afghanistan and Kampuchea issues—will be much more difficult to satisfy, should China choose to press the point, because the Soviet Union cannot act unilaterally to resolve differences. The possibility of a stalemate cannot be discounted, considering the longstanding animosity on both sides. In fact, the few relatively stress-free years in Sino-Soviet relations during the early 1950's can be viewed as an aberration in an otherwise well-established pattern of bilateral contention dating back to the 17th century.

While an indeterminate period of Sino-Soviet detente or limited accommodation may well be in the offing, Soviet leaders will have to make substantial concessions if the current thaw is to carry the

relationship much beyond that point. This assessment is based on several factors. First, China and the Soviet Union are, in a geostrategic sense, inevitable, long-term rivals. They are both large and ambitious; they have the world's longest land border between them (4,150 miles, plus 2,700 miles of Sino-Mongolian border); and they have a lingering territorial and boundary dispute which almost sparked a war in 1969. Second, both countries are already major regional powers in Asia, and China's ascendancy to the global stage adds still another dimension of competition and potential conflict. Third, prospects for diminishing tensions will be further dampened by Soviet plans for Siberian development and the likely proliferation of its political, economic, and security interests in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. The vulnerability of the Soviet strategic emplacement in the Far East is a serious long-term security concern for Kremlin planners and China is a major potential threat. Fourth, while less salient than in the 1960's, China and its socialist system represent an implicit threat to the legitimacy of the rival Soviet system. Should recent Chinese structural reforms actually succeed in building a more competitive socialist state in China, Soviet prestige and self-assurance would be diminished accordingly. Finally, the eventual modernization of China, even if 20 or 30 years off, carries elements of both promise and threat for much of the world, but few countries stand to be more directly affected than the Soviet Union. In the near term, the Soviet Union would be capable and perhaps willing to provide valuable economic and technological assistance to the Chinese; after all, most of China's heavy industry was either provided by the Soviet Union during the 1950's or subsequently derived from Soviet designs. In the long term, however, the Soviet leadership would be very reluctant to contribute in a meaningful way to a modernization drive which included among its ultimate objectives the development of the full range of modern military capabilities.

Before the three preconditions for better relations were specifically identified, Chinese sources spoke in terms of only one: the Soviet Union must stop trying to achieve hegemony. This declaration implied that since the Soviet Union would probably never do that, Sino-Soviet rapprochement was virtually impossible. Nothing in the recent statements of Chinese leaders indicates that their basic assessment of the Soviet Union as a hegemonist power

has been altered in the least. Given the circumstances that exist now, and which will likely exist in the future, the possibility of an even more cooperative Sino-Soviet relationship—entente or alliance on our continuum—is so remote that it hardly needs to be seriously considered. This could happen only if China, both as a state and as a nation, allowed itself to be absorbed as a *de facto* Soviet satellite, or if another nation (presumably the United States) somehow supplanted the Soviet Union as the principal enemy in China's strategic calculus. Since the former is inconceivable and the latter highly unlikely, movement along the continuum will be confined to tactical adjustments and perhaps a limited accommodation.

As noted earlier, the Soviet defensive situation in the Far East is very unfavorable. In addition to severe geographic limitations, the Soviet Union must confront two major adversaries simultaneously in the East—China and the United States—while contending with NATO in the West. Despite its military buildup in the Far East since 1978, particularly in air and naval assets, the Soviet Union faces the imminent prospect of further intensification of its military competition with the United States, Japan, and China. The Soviet Union improved its position when it obtained access to bases in Indochina, but still finds itself seriously constrained. Moreover, Soviet leaders cannot entertain any thought of reducing aid to Vietnam in order to mollify China; if they do, their access to the badly needed Vietnamese facilities could be jeopardized.

The Future of US-China Relations. While the potential for significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations appears constrained beyond the level of detente or, at the most, accommodation, prospects for a complete reversal of unfavorable trends in US-China relations are not encouraging. The deterioration of ties from 1980 to early 1983 can be attributed to many factors. In one respect, the overriding imperative for a united front with the United States no longer exists: the United States has been alerted to the serious threat posed by Soviet expansionism and is taking strong measures to rebuild its defenses and revitalize its alliances. In addition, the Soviet Union's prospects in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Eastern Europe, and much of the Third World have soured, thereby lowering China's threat perception. Under the circumstances, China can afford to stake out a more independent international position while making a bid for Third World

leadership. Perception of threat is the key motivation behind any strategic alignment, and the Soviet threat is now considered less imminent. Moreover, the post-Brezhnev leadership in the Kremlin may be more inclined to make concessions to the Chinese than was its predecessor, and this possibility is worth exploring. Finally, China may well be able, for the first time, to occupy the coveted position of "pivot power" in the triangular relationship; i.e., that power having the best relations with the other two.

Chinese critics of the alignment with the United States have also pointed to the disappointing failure of the Sino-American relationship to "pay off" in terms of substantial trade and technology transfer despite the preferential treatment accorded China over all other Communist countries. Moreover, increased arms sales by the United States, promised by former Secretary of State Haig, have not materialized due to the sensitivity of the technology, bureaucratic inertia, and the Taiwan issue. The frustration felt by the Chinese was summarized by former Foreign Minister Huang Hua in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in late 1982.

... I once said that the U.S. authorities had made many nice remarks about developing our bilateral relations. Yet, what has happened can be described by a Chinese saying, 'loud thunder, little rain.' ... In view of recent developments, one cannot but help asking: Does the U.S. government regard China as a friend or an adversary?"

The insoluble problem of Taiwan persists as the main impediment to a near-term improvement in US-China relations. It is a dilemma that both parties would have preferred to avoid, but which was to some degree inevitable given the prominent place Taiwan occupies in the political cultures of both the People's Republic and the United States. Although each side wants and needs to build a positive, durable bilateral relationship, when it comes to Taiwan neither is willing or, perhaps more accurately, able to pay the price which would be required to reach a full settlement.

Given the nature of the impasse over Taiwan, the most sensible short-term course for the United States to follow with China may simply be to deemphasize the strategic relationship for the time being, turn to other areas where interests are more compatible, and

attempt to work around the Taiwan issue on the basis of the Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. By concentrating on trade, investment, and such cooperative ventures as development of offshore oil deposits, the United States and China may be able to construct a more durable relationship.⁶¹ These ties, which have always been important, can be supplemented by contacts over the full range of nonsensitive mutual interests, including management training, professional education, scientific and technical exchanges, and cultural affairs.

This approach does not mean that the strategic alignment would be ignored or abandoned, but both sides are already well aware of where their parallel strategic interests lie. It does imply, however, that cooperation will be stressed in those areas where interests are most compatible, and least sensitive, and that strengthening the strategic alignment must follow an improvement in the overall political dimension of the relationship. The recent warming trend in Sino-American relations noted earlier has been based largely on this modest blueprint and may eventually lead to revived substantive contacts in the security realm.⁶² The events of 1981-82 proved conclusively that insofar as US-China relations are concerned, pure anti-Sovietism is an insufficient basis for international cooperation unless the perception of threat is so strong and immediate that survival interests appear to be in jeopardy.

Implications for the US-Soviet Military Balance. China's impact on the global balance is both perceptual and substantive, and in each instance finds its widest expression within the framework of the US-USSR-China triangular relationship. At least for the present, the perceptual role of China clearly outweighs its substantive role. As a large country with a massive population and huge agricultural and industrial output in aggregate terms, China is perceived to "count" in important ways. In addition, it possesses a great deal of long-term potential in some areas, and this reinforces the perception of Chinese power. When China's current capabilities—political, economic, and military—are objectively analyzed, its rather serious inadequacies quickly become evident. Nevertheless, the original perception persists and makes China's position relative to the two superpowers an important factor in the security calculations of the West.

The revival of Sino-Soviet bilateral negotiations underscores the tendency to focus on perception at the expense of reality. As noted earlier, the prospects are dim for anything more than a limited accommodation between China and the Soviet Union, even over the long term. Both China and the Soviet Union are playing as much to the gallery, especially the United States, as they are to each other. The Soviet leaders intend to show Washington that they have a "China card" of their own and that China is not a reliable partner in any neocontainment strategy directed at the Soviet Union. For their part, the Chinese wish to prove to the United States that their cooperation and goodwill cannot be taken for granted, while perhaps obtaining some incremental reductions in the Soviet threat arrayed against them.

Perceptual factors can also operate to the advantage of the United States and the West, however. The two explicit US security objectives identified earlier—to use China as a strategic counterweight to the USSR and to tie down Soviet forces on the border with China—have been achieved in the past largely by virtue of Soviet perceptions. The same factors which contributed to the *perception* of Chinese power in the West are mirrored, and indeed magnified, in the eyes of the Soviet Union due to inherent security imperatives (military-strategic factors) and inordinate fears of Chinese expansionism (psychological factors). Soviet leaders know that they cannot regain the dominant position over China which they enjoyed in the 1950's, and can only hope to drive a wedge between their adversaries, deal with each one *independently*, and play off one against the other. Therefore, China should remain a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union despite tactical shifts in its relations with the United States and other Western nations. Of course, China's value as a counterweight can be substantially increased by strong bilateral ties with the West in all areas, and this should be the overarching US policy objectives *vis-a-vis* China.

The second objective, tying down Soviet forces in the east to prevent their redeployment against NATO, is somewhat more complex, but it has also been achieved in the past largely due to Soviet perceptions of a residual Chinese threat. First of all, the purpose of Soviet air and naval forces stationed in the Far East must be clearly understood.⁶¹ China has never been a significant naval power in modern times and is unlikely to become one in this century. The presence of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and the recent

quantitative and qualitative improvements it has undergone, is primarily a function of the air and maritime threat to Soviet territory, population centers, and base facilities posed by the forward deployed forces of the United States and, presumably, allies such as Japan and South Korea.⁶⁴ Moreover, the bulk of the Soviet fleet could not redeploy outside the Northwest Pacific in either peacetime or wartime without leaving crucial areas in the Soviet Far East exposed. Finally, a wartime redeployment would face the added complications of a long, contested transit—perhaps halfway around the world—with little or no fleet air cover. Thus the Soviet Pacific Fleet will remain tied to the Far East so long as the US Seventh Fleet or any other credible naval threat remains in the area.

Much the same logic applies to the Soviet Far East air forces, although long-range and frontal aviation assets can be employed against either a US or a Chinese threat. However, the bulk of these air resources, and in particular the most modern aircraft, are committed either to the defense of key Far Eastern cities and military installations, which could not be seriously threatened by the PLA air force,⁶⁵ or are configured for antiship strikes against the US fleet. Few of the aircraft committed specifically against China would likely be available for release to the West, and even if they were, their additive contribution against NATO would be marginal inasmuch as they tend to be among the oldest models in the Soviet inventory. Once again, the presence of substantial forward deployed US and allied forces is the principal threat tying down Soviet air forces in the Far East.

The bulk of Soviet ground force deployments, on the other hand, are clearly oriented against China. Soviet forces deployed opposite China or elsewhere in the Far East are variously estimated at between 47 and 52 divisions with a total manpower of 460,000.⁶⁶ According to a 1981 US Department of Defense estimate, however, only 15 percent of these divisions are at a high (greater than 75 percent) level of readiness.⁶⁷ Whether any of these forces could be shifted to the west in wartime, a distance of up to 6,000 miles over the highly vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad, is debatable. The Soviet Union is prepared to fight a two-front war, as the formation of a Soviet Far East High Command in 1979 demonstrates. Even if a nonaggression pact was somehow concluded with China, substantial Soviet forces would still be required in the Far East to

protect against US and allied initiatives and/or possible Chinese treachery.⁶⁸

The Soviet Union, as a concession to China, could easily make a token withdrawal of up to several of its least capable divisions without seriously degrading its capabilities in the theater. Moreover, the equipment for these divisions, usually of the oldest types, would probably remain in the east even if the troops were withdrawn. In conclusion, a reduction of tensions on the Sino-Soviet border, even if it includes the withdrawal of a few Soviet divisions, is not likely to have serious *substantive* impact on US or allied security interests elsewhere. The *perceptual* impact, on the other hand, would probably be more significant. It need not be serious, however, so long as Western leaders understand the actual military implications. Such an eventuality should be treated with the concern which it warrants, but without excessive alarm.

CHINA AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000

Overall, the economic constraint on Chinese power emerges as clearly the most crucial and it appears highly improbable that China will be able to build an economy which could challenge those of the United States or the Soviet Union by the end of this century. China may possess the requisite territory, population, natural resources, political skill, social cohesion, and national will to become a superpower, but it will take more time than the brief span of two decades. The tremendous disparities in current levels of economic development are simply too great a handicap to overcome that quickly.

If China is not on the verge of superpower status, is a future of static or even reduced relative power a likely possibility? In order to fulfill such a prophecy, it would seem that China would have to experience either a disastrous war or prolonged upheaval akin to the Cultural Revolution. At present, the latter does not seem likely. The self-destructiveness of the past has been a bitter lesson, one which no one in China is eager to repeat. Whether "reformers" or "conservatives" rule in Beijing, progress is the measure by which their performance will be judged. Progress may be "two steps forward, one step back," but regression is not a tolerable policy option.

It appears that China, 20 years in the future, is likely to fall somewhere between the two extremes. While the variables are too numerous to allow any specific forecast, growth and development in some form appear most probable. While China will not be a superpower in the year 2000, it could conceivably join the first rank of world powers, no small achievement in itself. Spared war and catastrophic internal upheaval, China is probably the most prominent among a small handful of countries possessing the potential to develop into superpowers in the next century.

Problems in forecasting China's power are compounded by the dynamics of the international system. The power of China can only be assessed relative to the power of the other major players in the system, but the system itself is constantly in flux. For example, the future relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is extremely important to China. Over the next two decades, both superpowers will continue to share crucial interests in raising standards of living in their respective countries; managing shortages in military manpower; reducing somewhat the burgeoning economic costs inherent in uncontrolled arms races; resolving crises short of war; and maintaining a stable deterrent balance. Bilateral negotiations will remain a prominent feature of US-Soviet relations,⁶⁹ but are not likely to resolve conclusively the divergent interests which underlie their global competition. Soviet foreign policy will continue to reflect the basic dualism of expansion and coexistence, and the United States will be compelled to respond accordingly.

If this projection of US-Soviet relations materializes, what would be China's impact on the global strategic balance 20 years hence? The growth in national power which can be expected to accompany a moderately successful modernization and development program should reduce China's strategic vulnerability. This would most notably affect the Soviet Union, but extends to the United States and any other nation with the capacity to threaten seriously China or its crucial interests. To the extent that China overcomes its military deficiencies, gradual shifts in its foreign policy should become evident. As Chinese power grows, the "united front" aspect of its international strategy will likely be retained, but the operational importance attached to it progressively diminished. At present, other "antihegemonists"—the United States, the Third World, or whomever—play a critical role in redressing the strategic

imbalance between China and the Soviet Union. If the upgrading of its own capabilities begins to close this gap of vulnerability, China will be afforded greater flexibility in its foreign policy to pursue exclusive Chinese interests.

The single most potent element of China's expanded power and influence will likely be the growth of its strategic nuclear forces. Despite the economic setbacks and political turmoil of the past 25 years, China has carefully nurtured a modest, independent nuclear weapons development program, producing both warheads and delivery systems. From a fission device in 1964, through a thermonuclear detonation in 1967, to the successful test of a full-range ICBM in 1980 and an SLBM in 1982, the Chinese effort has been characterized by steady, if unspectacular, progress. The current emphasis on scientific advancement, industrial modernization, and the acquisition of advanced foreign technology can provide an unprecedented boost to China's strategic programs. The operational deployment of nuclear missile submarines sometime in this decade will further extend China's global reach.

As ICBM and nuclear missile submarine deployments expand the limits of Chinese power, it would not be surprising if China's global interests proliferate accordingly. The ability to project power well beyond its own borders could make China more inclined to identify crucial economic and world order interests in affairs previously beyond its capability to influence. As a practical matter, greater involvement in affairs once considered within the exclusive domain of the two superpowers is not only possible, but probable. At the same time, Chinese claims to regional predominance in Asia would be largely realized, Japan's economic power notwithstanding. Finally, China cannot hope to match fully the strategic capabilities of either the United States or the Soviet Union, at least by the year 2000. But the Chinese need not duplicate the arsenals of the two superpowers in order to create the perception of a fairly high order of usable power. As an independent player possessing a modest range of nuclear capabilities, China could seek to more directly influence the course of global events if it felt its crucial interests were being threatened.

In conclusion, even if China's modernization efforts are only moderately successful, the long-term impact on international relations may well be dramatic. Should China continue to develop independently and improve its nuclear capabilities, and there is no

reason to expect otherwise, the implications for the strategic balance are especially significant. After decades of managing a bipolar balance, the superpowers, by the year 2000, may have to acknowledge the existence of a triangular balance. Strategic considerations may align China with one superpower or the other for a time, but in the long term it is, and consciously seeks to be, an independent power center. Assuring global stability in an environment which features continued East-West competition, growing North-South tensions, global energy crises, and a precarious world economy could be seriously complicated by China's emergence. The arms limitation process, for example, is already threatened by the proliferation of participants—among them China—and the increasing complexity of the issues. Finally, China aspires to be the major power in Asia, and here, perhaps more than anywhere else, Chinese, Soviet, and American interests are likely to conflict in future decades.

ENDNOTES

1. For one approach to national interests, see Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy," a paper prepared for the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, National Defense University, October 8-9, 1982. See also Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1978, Chapter 1.

2. Among the most definitive statements of US national security strategy under the Reagan Administration was the address by the President's national security advisor, William P. Clark, to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, May 21, 1982. See also the address of the Presidential special assistant, Thomas C. Reed in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 21, August 15, 1982.

3. Clark, *ibid*.

4. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1982-83*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 836-839. Japan is now second only to Canada as the largest trading partner of the United States; South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, and China are also important partners. Indonesia provides 6 percent of the petroleum consumed annually in the United States, and other Asian countries supply scarce strategic minerals. US trade with South Asia is relatively insignificant; in 1981 it accounted for only 2.5 percent of the total trade with Asia.

5. The range of security issues and problems, with particular emphasis on Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, is explored in William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

6. Address by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Japan National Press Club, Tokyo, Japan, March 26, 1982.

7. *Ibid*.

8. David Jenkins, "Measuring the Response," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 118, No. 43, October 22, 1982, pp. 25-28. See also the interview with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 119, No. 13, March 31, 1983, p. 26.

9. In November 1982 Premier Zhao Ziyang informed Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda that "Should the Vietnamese authorities dare to invade Thailand by force, the Chinese Government and people will stand firmly by the side of Thailand and give all support to the Thai people in their just stand of opposing aggression." *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 48, November 29, 1982, p. 7.

10. For an introduction to China's relations with Southeast Asia, see Takashi Tajima, *China and South-East Asia: Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects*, Adelphi Paper No. 172, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.

11. *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1982-83*, p. 838, and Christopher S. Wren, "US-China Trade Down 5.5%," *The New York Times*, February 3, 1983, p. D11.

12. "China Says Oil Reserves Total 219 Billion Barrels," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 9, 1982, p. 39. Western experts now estimate China's offshore reserves to range between 30 and 100 billion barrels. Thomas J. Lueck, "Plumbing China Oil Reserves," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1983, p. D1.

13. Dinah Lee, "Exxon, China Said to Agree on Oil Accord," *The Washington Post*, August 17, 1983, p. A1.

14. "Peking Says 15,000 Students Will Be Sent Abroad for Study," *The New York Times*, December 13, 1982, p. A8.

15. For background and an up-to-date summary of the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations, see "U.S.-China Joint Communiqué," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2067, October 1982, pp. 19-22, and Michel Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Fall 1982, pp. 175-195.

16. See, for example, Michel Oksenberg, "The Dynamics of the Sino-American Relationship" and Strobe Talbott, "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship," in Richard H. Solomon, ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981, pp. 48-80 and 81-113, respectively.

17. Statement of Admiral Robert L. J. Long, Commander in Chief, US Forces, Pacific, before the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, March 16, 1982. *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968 (H.R. 6030) Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983*, Part 1, Military Posture, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 1003-1004.

18. Statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 10, 1982, in "Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in East Asia and the Pacific," US Department of State, Current Policy No. 403.

19. Philip Taubman, "U.S., Peking Jointly Monitor Russian Missiles," *The New York Times*, June 18, 1981, p. A1.

20. Address by Leonid I. Brezhnev to a conference of Soviet Army and Navy command personnel, Moscow, October 27, 1982, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, November 15, 1982.

21. Harry Gelman, *The Politburo's Management of Its America Problem*, Rand Report R-2707-NA, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, April 1981.

22. The origins of Soviet security policy are not all functions of US-USSR global competition or simple reactions to perceived vulnerability; elements of historic imperialism, nationalism, and militarism, are often cited as well. See Rebecca V. Strobe and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXX, No. 6, November-December 1981, pp. 1-15. Also see John Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence" in Robert Kennedy and John Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Issues Reappraised*, Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming 1983.

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24. Sidney Bearman, "Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World: East Asia," in Christoph Bertram, ed., *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s*, London: Archon Books, 1980.

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27. Robert W. Campbell, "Prospects for Siberian Economic Development," in Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, pp. 229-254; Theodore Shabad, "Siberian Development and Soviet Policies in East Asia," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1982, pp. 195-208; and Whiting, Chapter 2.

28. Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall."

29. Shabad, pp. 202-208. See also *Asian Security 1979*, Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1979, pp. 55-56.

30. Edward A. Hewett and Herbert S. Levine, "The Soviet Union's Economic Relations in Asia," in Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, pp. 201-228; see also Stuart Kirby, "Siberia and East Asia: Economic and General Relations Between Siberia and Its Far Eastern Neighbors," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1982, pp. 151-194.

31. For an evaluation of Japanese threat perceptions see Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Threat and the Security of Japan," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, pp. 231-246.

32. *Asian Security 1981*, pp. 43-47; and *Asian Security 1982*, pp. 39-43.

33. Statement of Admiral Long, p. 1000. Other sources give estimates ranging up to \$6 million a day; see *Asian Security 1982*, p. 36.

34. For a discussion of the impact of the great powers on Korea, see Robert G. Sutter, "U.S.-Soviet-PRC Relations and Their Implications for Korea," *Korea & World Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 5-20.

35. Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Extends Its Military Ties," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol. IX, No. 5, November 1982, pp. 55-58.

36. *Asian Security 1981*, pp. 47-64, and *Asian Security 1982*, pp. 35-38 and 117-122.

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40. For a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of the border issue, see David Rees, *Soviet Border Problems: China and Japan*, Conflict Studies No. 139, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982. The dispute flared again publicly in early 1983; Serge Schmemann, "China is Assailed in Soviet Journal," *The New York Times*, January 15, 1983, p. 1.

41. See, for example, Samuel S. Kim, "Mao Zedong and China's Changing Worldview," in *China in the Global Community*, James C. Hsiung and Kim, eds., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 32, and Thomas Fingar, "Introduction: The Quest for Independence," in Fingar, ed., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 2-5.

42. Zhou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government" to the Fourth National People's Congress, *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4, January 24, 1975, p. 23.

43. Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization," (Report to the 12th National Party Congress), *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 37, September 13, 1982, p. 15.

44. Robert Delfs, "Laying the Foundations," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 118, No. 50, December 10, 1982, pp. 58-60, and Zhao Ziyang, "Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 51, December 20, 1982, pp. 10-35. China's developmental strategy was further refined in Zhao's "Report on the Work of the Government" delivered at the First Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 26, No. 27, July 4, 1983, pp. 1-XXIV.

45. *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 36, September 6, 1982, p. 5. For the full text of Deng's opening speech, see *The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (September 1982)*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1982, pp. 1-6.

46. Deng Xiaoping's address to a special session of the United Nations, as reported in *Peking Review*, Vol. 17, No. 16, April 19, 1974, pp. 6-11.

47. William R. Heaton, Jr., *A United Front Against Hegemony: Chinese Foreign Policy Into the 1980's*, Monograph Series No. 80-3, Washington: National Defense University Press, March 1980, pp. 8-9.

48. Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization," pp. 16-17. Other instances of alleged US hegemonism frequently cited include US Middle East policy in general and continued support for Israel in particular, cooperation with South Africa, and (largely for Kim Il-sung's benefit) the continued US military presence in South Korea.

49. Zhou Jirong, et. al., "Stick Together Through Thick and Thin, Join Forces in Fighting Hegemonism," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *China Daily Report*, October 26, 1982, p. A3.

50. See, for example, Mu Youlin, "Opposing Hegemonism," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 32, August 9, 1982, p. 3, emphasis added.

51. For detailed assessments of the European dimension of the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Trond Gilberg, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute in Eastern Europe," and Joan Barth Urban, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute in Western Europe," in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, pp. 268-294 and 295-324, respectively.

52. *The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC*, p. 4.

53. *The Military Balance 1982-1983*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 78-81.

54. "Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Missile," *The New York Times*, October 17, 1982, p. 15. See also Agatha S. Y. Wong-Fraser, "China's Nuclear Deterrent," *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 467, September 1981, pp. 245-249ff.

55. For a detailed discussion of Chinese military doctrine, see William R. Heaton, Jr., "The Defense Policy of the People's Republic of China," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A*

Comparative Study, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 419-440.

56. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 90, June 1982, pp. 253-270.

57. For further discussion of China's impact on the global balance, with particular attention to Europe, see the essays in Gerald Segal, ed., *The China Factor*, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982.

58. The following definitions apply to these terms: *detente* - relaxation, easing, or reduction of tensions; *normalization* - establishment of "normal" state-to-state relations; *accommodation* - adjustment of differences, reconciliation; *rapprochement* - reestablishment of harmonious relations; *entente* - a friendly understanding (to cooperate for mutual benefit); and *alliance* - a formal agreement to cooperate for specific purposes.

59. Mary Wisniewski, "All Talk, No Action," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 119, No. 12, March 24, 1983, p. 12. For a detailed analysis of the post-Brezhnev thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, see Donald S. Zagoria, "The Moscow-Beijing Detente," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4, Spring 1983, pp. 853-873.

60. Richard M. Weintraub, "State Dept. Wary on Sino-Soviet Initiative," *The Washington Post*, October 19, 1982, p. A11.

61. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East Asia, Eugene Lawson, may have been exaggerating only slightly when he stated that "offshore oil is the cutting edge of Sino-U.S. relations for the rest of this century." Christopher S. Wren, "China Energy: Chance for U.S.," *The New York Times*, October 14, 1982, p. D1.

62. Richard Nations, "Raising the Barriers" and "Turning the Other Cheek," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 120, No. 24, June 16, 1983, pp. 16-18, and Vol. 121, No. 30, July 28, 1983, pp. 14-15, respectively.

63. For an extensive analysis, see Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, Rand Report R-2943-AF, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, August 1982.

64. For a thorough analysis of the dynamic interaction of weapons systems, geographic constraints, and opposing forces in Asia (especially the Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific area), see *Asian Security 1981*, Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1981, pp. 73-85.

65. An analysis of PLA Air Force operations during the 1979 border war with Vietnam concluded that PLAAF activities were "largely cosmetic" and that it "could hardly be an effective instrument for any offensive actions." James B. Linder and A. James Gregor, "The Chinese Communist Air Force in the 'Punitive' War Against Vietnam," *Air University Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, September/October 1981, pp. 73 and 74, respectively.

66. *The Military Balance 1982-1983*, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982, p. 15, and US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 2d ed., Washington: US Government Printing Office, March 1983, p. 9.

67. US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, September 1981, p. 7. Soviet ground force readiness levels are classified by category levels: I (75-100 percent strength with complete equipment), II (50-75 percent strength complete with fighting vehicles), and III (less than 50 percent strength—typically 25 percent—with some fighting vehicles). Approximately 35 percent and 50 percent of the Soviet divisions in the Far East are

at Category II and III levels respectively. However, the USSR's current peacetime military deployments are more than ample to deal with any thrust by the Chinese PLA, which is severely constrained by outdated weaponry, poor communications, a lack of battlefield mobility, and limited power projection capabilities. Moreover, the Chinese military doctrine, still essentially that of "people's war," is suited only for strategic defense.

68. Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Far East High Command: A New Developmental Factor in the USSR Military Strategy Toward East Asia," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1982, pp. 29-71, and Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup*, pp. 108-112.

69. Robert Kennedy, "The Problems and Prospects of START" in Kennedy and Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West*.